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Abstract 
This paper studies testing based on iabelled transition systems, presenting two test generation algorithms with their corre- 
sponding implementation relations. The first algorithm assumes that implementations communicate with their environment 
via symmetric, synchronous interactions. It is based on the theory of testing equivalence and preorder, as is most of the 
testing theory for labelled transition systems, and it is found in the literature in some slightly different variations. The second 
algorithm is based on the assumption that implementations communicate with their environment via inputs and outputs. 
Such implementations are formalized by restricting the class of labelled transition systems to those systems that can always 
accept input actions. For these implementations a testing theory is developed, analogous to the theory of testing equivalence 
and preorder. It consists of implementation relations formalizing the notion of conformance of these implementations with 
respect o labelled transition system specifications, test cases and test suites, test execution, the notion of passing a test suite, 
and the test generation algorithm, which is proved to produce sound test suites for one of the implementation relations. 
Keywords: Communication protocols; Formal description techniques; Transition systems; Conformance; Conformance testing; Test case 
generation 
1. Introduction 
Protocol conformance testing involves testing of a protocol implementation with respect to its specification. 
The aim is to increase the level of confidence in the correct functioning of the implementation as prescribed by 
the specification, and to contribute in this way to successful communication between computer systems. 
With the increasing use of formal methods for specifying the required behaviour it is necessary to consider 
conformance testing of protocol implementations with respect to such specifications. Apart from this necessity, 
the use of formal methods in conformance testing has its advantages, such as the precise, formal definition of 
conformance and conformance testing concepts, the algorithmic, tool supported generation of test suites from 
formal specifications, and the possibility of formally verifying the correctness of a test case with respect to a 
specification. These possible advantages have led to a lot of research in the area of formal conformance testing, 
leading to several methods for the algorithmic generation of tests for different specification formalisms. To put 
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these different methods in a general context, and to define the basic concepts of conformance testing in an 
abstract way, also frameworks have been studied, among others within the standardization community in the 
project “Formal Methods in Conformance Testing” (ISO/IEC JTC l/SC 21 Project 54, ITU T Q.g/lO). The 
scope of this standardization activity is to define a general methodology on how to perform conformance testing 
of a protocol implementation given a formal specification of a protocol standard [ 3 11. 
One of the specification formalisms studied in the realm of formal conformance testing is that of labelled 
transition systems. A labelled transition system is a structure consisting of states with transitions, labelled 
with actions, between them. The formalism of labelled transition systems can be used for modelling the 
behaviour of processes, and it serves as a semantic model for various formal specification languages, e.g., CCS 
[ 38,391, CSP [ 271, ACP [9], and LOTOS [6,30]. Also a large part of the semantics of languages like Estelle 
[29] and SDL [ 171 can be expressed in labelled transition systems. Testing theory and algorithms for the 
generation of tests from labelled transition system specifications have been developed during the last decade, 
e.g., [ 1,l 1,13,19,21,20,24,25,33,45,42,47,54,49] . All these methods, as most of the theory on labelled transition 
systems, are based on synchronous, symmetric communication between different processes: communication 
between two processes occurs if both processes offer to interact on a particular action, and if the interaction 
takes place it occurs synchronously in both participating processes, without a notion of distinction between input 
and output actions. For testing theories a particular case where such communication occurs, is the modelling of 
the interaction between a tester and an implementation under test during test execution. We will refer to above 
theories as testing with symmetric interactions. 
This paper will present two algorithms for the generation of tests from a labelled transition system spec- 
ification. The presentations will be in the vein of the framework in [ 311: they involve the definition of a 
model to describe implementations, the definition of an implementation relation that formalizes the notion of 
conformance of an implementation with respect to a specification, the description of test cases, test suites, and 
how to pass a test suite, and finally the development of the test generation algorithm that produces provably 
correct test cases. 
The first algorithm is based on symmetric interactions as explained above, and it can be found in the literature 
in some slightly different variations [ 10,l 1,19,42,54,49]. 
The second algorithm approaches communication in a different manner by distinguishing explicitly between 
the inputs and the outputs of a system. Outputs are actions that are initiated by, and under control of the 
system, while input actions are initiated by, and under control of the system’s environment; a system can never 
refuse to perform its input actions. Communication takes place between inputs of the system and outputs of the 
environment, or the other way around. This implies that an interaction is not symmetric anymore with respect 
to the communicating processes. Many real-life implementations allow such a classification of their actions, 
communicating with their environment via inputs and outputs. 
The next section introduces labelled transition systems as the formalism of our discourse. Section 3 gives 
some basic testing concepts for labelled transition systems, such as a test case, a test suite, a test run, and passing 
a test suite. The existing approaches to labelled transition system testing are presented in Section 4. A few 
implementation relations and a test generation algorithm are given, all based on symmetric interactions. Section 5 
introduces input-output transition systems to model implementations that communicate via inputs and outputs. 
An input-output transition system is a special kind of labelled transition system with the restriction that inputs are 
always enabled. Implementation relations for input-output transition systems are studied in Section 6. Finally, 
a test generation algorithm that produces provably correct test cases to test input-output transition systems 
with respect to labelled transition system specifications for one of the implementation relations of Section 6 
is developed in Section 7. In Section 8 some concluding remarks are given, among which a comparison of 
symmetric and input-output testing, and a brief comparison with other transition-system based models that 
distinguish between inputs and outputs, like input-output state machines [43], input/output automata [37], 
and queue contexts [ 5 11. Complete proofs for some of the theorems are found in Appendix A. 
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2. Labelled transition systems 
The formalism of labelled transition systems is used as the basis for describing the behaviour of processes, 
such as specifications, implementations, and tests. 
Definition 2.1. A labelled transition system is a 4-tuple (S, L, T, SO) where 
l S is a countable, non-empty set of states; 
l L is a countable set of labels; 
l T C S x ( L U {T}) x S is the transition relation; 
l SO E S is the initial state. 
The labels in L represent the observable interactions of a system; the special label r $! L represents an 
unobservable, internal action. We denote the class of all labelled transition systems over L by fYs( L). For 
technical reasons we restrict fXS( L) to labelled transition systems that are strongly converging, i.e., ones that 
do not have infinite compositions of transitions with internal actions. 
A trace is a finite sequence of observable actions. The set of all traces over L is denoted by L*, with E 
denoting the empty sequence. If CTI ,u2 f L”, then CTI aa2 is the concatenation of CTI and ~2. With f CT j the 
length of trace v is denoted, i.e., the (finite) number of occurrences of actions in g. Some additional notations 
and properties are introduced in Definitions 2.2 and 2.3. 
Definition 2.2. Let p = (S, L,T, se) be a labelled transition system with s, s’ E S, and let ,u(~, E L u {r}, 
a(i) E L, and ~7 E L*. 
=def (s, Pu, s’> E T 
=&f 3SO,...,S,: S=SO&S, 3 
=d~f &’ : s P1’.-‘h ,s’ 
=def not &’ : s PI’...‘P>l ,s’ 
=def 
s=s’ or sxs’ 
=def 3s,,s2 : s&-s, -k&s 
=d<f :So...S,: S=S,-&‘S,%- 
=d<f 3s’ : s&s’ 
=def not 3s’ : S % S’ 
. * &+ s, = s’ 
a- S,$ = s’ 
We will not always distinguish between a labelled transition system and its initial state: if p = (S, L, T, so), 
then we will identify the process p with its initial state SO, and we write, for example, p =% instead of SO g . 
Definition 2.3,. 
( 1) traces(p) =dtf {-L*I& } 
(2) inW) =dcf { a E L I PG } 
(3) p aftercr =def h”bh+} 
(4) der(p) =def { p’ 1 %E L* : p&p’ } 
(5) p has jinite behaviour if there is an n E N, such that Vu E truces(p) : 1 u ) < n. 
(6) p is jinite-state if der(p) is finite. 
(7) p is deterministic if for all u E L*, p after u has at most one element. If (+ E traces(p), then we 
overload p after CT to denote this element. 
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Fig. 1. Labelled transition systems. 
We represent a labelled transition system by a tree or a graph, where nodes represent states and edges 
represent transitions, or in a process-algebraic manner by a behaviour expression (cf. LOTOS [ 6,301) . 
Definition 2.4. A behaviour expression B is an expression with the following syntax: 
B =dqf stop(a;B(i;BIB Cl BIBJIB(8B 
where a E L, and B is a countable set of behaviour expressions. 
The operational semantics are given by the following axioms and inference rules, which define for each 
behaviour expression all its possible transitions (stop has no transitions): 
Example 2.5. To illustrate the concepts of labelled transition systems we use very simple and intuitive candy 
machines. More complicate systems, e.g., communication protocols, can also be modelled as labelled transition 
systems, however, for the moment the complexity of such systems would divert the attention, while not being 
necessary to illustrate the main concepts of this paper. 
Fig. 1 gives examples of candy machines over the labelset L = {shil, liq, choc}. The candy machines interact 
with their environment by insertions of shillings, and by supplying liquorice and chocolate. System p3 models 
a machine that accepts a shilling, and then either it supplies liquorice, or it makes an internal transition to a 
state where it cannot supply liquorice anymore, but where it offers chocolate. A behaviour expression for p3 
is shil; (liq; stop q i; choc; stop). For p3 we have, for example, 
shil 
liq 
P3 ===+ P5/’ and p[’ + . 
3. Conformance testing for labelled transition systems 
Starting point for conformance testing is a specification in some (formal) notation, and an implementation, 
that is, a device or program interacting with its environment, which is considered as a black box. Test cases are 
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derived from the specification, and applied to the implementation, such that from the results of applying them 
it can be concluded whether the implementation conforms to the specification. 
In this paper labelled transition systems, or any formal language with underlying semantics in terms of labelled 
transition systems, are considered as the formal notation for specifications. Implementations, being physical, real 
objects, are, in principle, not amenable to formal reasoning. We can only deal with implementations in a formal 
way, if we make the assumption that any real implementation has a formal model, with which we could reason 
formally. This formal model is only assumed to exist, but it is not known a priori. This assumption is referred to 
as the test hypothesis [ 8,31,50]. In Section 4 we will consider as the test hypothesis that also implementations 
could be described as labelled transition systems. In Sections 5, 6 and 7 a stronger test hypothesis will be put 
forward by assuming that implementations can be modelled by a subclass of labelled transition systems: the 
input-output transition systems. Thus the test hypothesis allows us to reason about implementations as if they 
were labelled transition systems, or input-output transition systems, respectively. 
Having specifications and implementations the next important thing is to define what it means for an 
implementation to conform to a specification, otherwise no useful test can ever be generated. Conformance is 
defined by means of an implementation relation between the models of implementations and the specifications 
[ 5,31,50], in our case a relation imp C L7S( L) x L7S( L): an implementation i E CIS( L) conforms to 
specification s E LIS(L) if and only if i imp S. 
The next step is to consider test cases and test suites. A test case is a specification of the behaviour of a tester 
in an experiment to be carried out with an implementation under test. Such behaviour, like other behaviours, 
can be specified by a labelled transition system. An experiment should last for a finite time, so a test case 
should have finite behaviour. Moreover, a tester executing a test case would like to have as much control as 
possible over the testing process, so nondeterminism in a test case is undesirable. To be able to decide about 
the success of a test a verdict (pass or fail) is attached to each state of the test case. 
Definition 3.1,. 
( 1) A zest case t is a 5tuple (S, L, T, V, so), such that (S, L, T, sc) is a deterministic labelled transition system 
with finite behaviour, and v : S + {fail,pass} is a verdict function. 
The class of test cases over actions in L is denoted by LIS,( L). Definitions applicable to L’7S( L) 
are extended to C7S, (L) by defining them over the underlying labelled transition system. 
(2) A test suite T is a set of test cases: T E P( CIS, (L) ), where P( CIS,( L) ) is the powerset of 
137S, (L) , i.e., the set of all possible subsets of L7S, (L) . 
Running a test case is modelled by the synchronous parallel execution of the test case with the implementation 
under test, which continues until no more interactions are possible, i.e., until a deadlock occurs. This deadlock 
may occur when the (finite) test case reaches a final state, or when the combination reaches a state where 
the actions proposed by the test case cannot be accepted by the implementation. An implementation passes a 
test run if and only if the verdict of the test case in the state where the deadlock is reached is pass. Since 
an implementation can behave nondeterministically different test runs of the same test case with the same 
implementation may lead to different final states, and hence to different verdicts. An implementation passes a 
test case if and only if all possible test runs lead to the verdict pass. This means that each test case must be 
executed several times in order to give a final verdict, theoretically even infinitely many times. 
Definition 3.2. 
( 1) A deadlock of process p E CIS( L) is a trace u E L*, after which no more observable actions are 
possible: 
p after u deadlocks =&f 3p’ : p & p’ and init = 0 
(2) A test ,~ult of a test case t E CIS,( L) with an implementation i E L7S( L) is a trace of the synchronous 
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Fig. 2. Test cases. 
parallel composition of t and i leading to deadlock: 
u is a test run of t and i =&f (t /I i) after u deadlocks 
(3) An implementation i passes a test case t, if all the test runs of t and i lead to a pass-state of t: 
i passes t =&f Vu E L* : t )I i after u deadlocks implies v( t after (T ) = pass 
(4) An implementation i passes a test suite T, if it passes all test cases in T: 
i passes T =&f Vt E T : i passes t
If an implementation does not pass a test suite, it fails: i fails T =def It E T : i pasjes t. 
Example 3.3. Fig. 2 gives some test cases, The only test run of tl with p1 is shil+liq: 
t1 II PI 
shil&q ,, 
>t, Ijpy and Vu EL: t~IIp~‘& 
Since Y( ti’) = pass, we have that p1 passes tl. 
The test runs of tl with p3 are {shil+liq,shiZ} : 
t1 II P3 
shikliq 
>tyIIpf and VaEL: ty/Ip;‘G 
tl I/p3 a t’l I)pjll and VaEL: tiIIp:“& 
Since v( ty) = pass and v( t; ) = fail, we have that p3 fails tl. 
To obtain test suites test generation algorithms have to be developed, which, given a specification, generate 
a test suite. Formally, a test generation algorithm can be expressed as a function 
@nimp : LcIS(L) - P(Lirs,(L)) (3.1) 
A generated test suite gen;,,( ) s must test implementations for conformance with respect to s and imp. Ideally, 
an implementation should pass the test suite if and only if it is conforming. In this case the test suite is called 
complete [ 3 11. Unfortunately, in almost all practical cases such a test suite would be infinitely large, hence 
for practical testing we have to restrict to test suites that can only detect non-conformance, but that cannot 
assure conformance. Such test suites are called sound. Test suites that can only assure conformance, but not 
non-conformance are called exhaustive. 
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Definition 3.4. Let s be a specification, imp an implementation relation, and T a test suite, then 
T is complete =def vi : i imp S iff i passes T 
T is sound =&f ‘di : i imp s implies i passes T 
T is exhaustive =&f vi : i imp s if i passes T 
4. Conformance testing based on symmetric interactions 
This section presents some implementation relations for labelled transition systems, which can be found in 
the literature, together with a sound test generation method for one of these relations: the relation conf. These 
relations and the corresponding testing method use the test hypothesis that implementations can be modelled 
as labelled transition systems. Communication between a labelled transition system and its environment is 
modelled by the synchronized parallel composition 11 (Definition 2.4), where the communication is symmetric: 
if a system wi,shes to communicate with its environment it proposes some actions on which it is prepared to 
interact. The environment also proposes some actions, and then they interact on one of the actions that they 
both propose. ‘The role of both communicating processes is the same and symmetric, and all actions (except 
for the internal action r) are treated in the same way. 
Implementatiori relations 
Many different possibilities for implementation relations on fX?S(L) have been studied, e.g., observation 
equivalence [ 381, strong bisimulation equivalence and weak bisimulation equivalence [ 41,391, failure equiva- 
lence and prea~rder [ 271, testing equivalence and preorder [ 211, failure trace equivalence and preorder [ 161, 
generalized failure equivalence and preorder [ 321, and many others [ 25,261. A straightforward example, based 
on the definitions of Section 2, is trace preorder Ifr, which requires inclusion of trace sets. The intuition behind 
this relation is that an implementation i E CIS( 15) may show only behaviour, in terms of traces of observable 
actions, which is specified in the specification s E ,US( L). 
Definition 4.1. Let i, s E LTs(L), then i I,,. s =&f traces(i) 2 traces(s) 
Example 4.2. Consider Fig. 1: pr <,, p2 and p2 & ~1, since traces(pl ) = traces(pz) = {E, shil, shil.liq, shil. 
choc}. AlsO P4 Ltr PI, but PI $tr ~‘4. 
Considering Example 4.2 we have, for example, p2 Irr pl, which is interpreted as ‘implementation p2 
correctly implements specification PI with respect to trace preorder’. However, pi specifies that after inserting 
a shilling the user has a choice between liquorice and chocolate, while p2 may refuse to supply one of these 
sweets: after inserting a shilling the machine makes the nondeterministic choice between offering liquorice or 
chocolate. Suppose the machine chooses to offer liquorice, and the user makes a choice for chocolate, then a 
deadlock occurs: no further interaction is possible between the machine offering the interaction liquorice and 
the user willing to interact on chocolate. A user faced with p2 as an implementation of p1 will certainly be 
disappointed. 
The reason for the disappointment is that trace preorder str only considers sequences of observable ac- 
tions; it does not care about who is going to resolve choices in the behaviour: the machine internally or 
the external environment. A more sophisticated, and stronger implementation relation is testing preorder 
[ 201. In addhion to requiring that the traces observed with the implementation are contained in those ob- 
served with the specification, testing preorder requires that any possible user encountering a deadlock with 
the implememation will experience the same deadlock when interacting with the specification. This idea 
for an implementation relation is formalized by modelling the observing users themselves as labelled tran- 
sition systems, and by modelling the observation of deadlock as a trace leading to a combined state of 
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the machine and the user from which no further interactions are possible (see Definition 3.2). One could 
say that testing preorder is the relation on labelled transition systems, where any discrepancy of the im- 
plementation from the specification can exactly be observed by another labelled transition system. As such, 
testing preorder is an important implementation relation in this paper from which other relations will be 
derived. 
Definition 4.3. 
( 1) The sets of observutions, obs and ohs’ respectively, that an observer u E CIS( L) can make of 
process p E L7S(L) are given by the deadlocks, respectively the traces of the synchronized parallel 
communication of u and p: 
obs(u,p) =def { CT E L* 1 (U 11 p) after u deadlocks } 
obs’twp) =def { flEL* I ullp+ 
(2) Implementation i E ,CcIS( L) is in testing preorder with specification s E C7S( L), if for all possible 
observers the observations made with i are included in those of s: 
i II, s =dcf Vu E C7S(L) : obs(u,i) & obs(u,s) and obs’(u,i) C obs’(u,s) 
The definition of It, in Definition 4.3 is extensional, i.e., in terms of how the environment (i.c. the observer 
u) perceives a system. This definition can be rewritten into an intensional characterization, i.e., a characterization 
in terms of properties of the labelled transition systems themselves. This characterization, given in terms of 
failure pairs (Proposition 4.5) coincides with failure preorder on our class of strongly-converging transition 
systems (for a proof see, for example, [20,49]). 
Definition 4.4. Let p E L7S( L), (T E L*, and A 2 L, then 
p after CT refuses A =&f 3~‘: p&p’ and VCZEA: p’& 
Proposition 4.5. i ste s iff ( Vu E L’, VA C L : i after (+ refuses A implies s after u refuses A ) 
Example 4.6. Consider again Fig. 1. We have p1 It, ~2: there is no u, A, such that p1 after u refuses A 
and not ( p2 after u refuses A ). 
But p2 & ~1, since p2 after shil refuses {liq} and not ( pl after shil refuses {liq} ). Also p4 fte p3, 
because p4 after shil refuses (choc} , which does not hold for ~3, but ps I,, p3, and also p1 I,, p3, 
The relation sre does not allow extra traces in the implementation: 
PI fte p4, since pl after shil.choc refuses 8 , and not ( p4 after shil.choc refuses 0 ). 
An implementation relation that is strongly related to I,, is the relation conf [ 13,111. It is a modification of 
jle by restricting all observations to only those traces that are contained in the specification s. This restriction 
makes testing a lot easier: only traces of the specification have to be considered, not the huge complement of 
this set, i.e., the traces not explicitly specified. Saying it in other words, conf requires that an implementation 
does what it should do, not that it does not do what it is not allowed to do. 
Definition 4.7. i conf s =def Vu E fZ7S( L) : ( obs(u, i) CT truces(s) ) & obs(u, s) 
and ( obs’(u, i) fl traces(s) ) G obs’( u, s) 
Proposition 4.8. 
i conf s iff ( Vu E traces(s) , VA C L : i after u refuses A implies s after u refuses A ) 
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We conclude this part with relating the different implementation relations. 
Proposition 4.9. 
(1) srr and ste are preorder-s; conf is rejkxive, but not transitive. 
(2) sir = sir n conf 
Example 4.10. Consider again Fig. 1. From Proposition 4.9( 2) follows that i ste s implies i conf s, hence all 
systems that are related by ste (see Example 4.6) are also related by conf. 
Consider the ones not related by It, in Example 4.6: p2 co$f ~1, since p2 after shil refuses {liq} , 
not ( p1 after shil refuses {Eiq} ) and shil E traces( pI ) . Analogously p4 co@ p3. 
But the relation conf does allow extra traces in the implementation: p1 conf ~4, although p1 after shil. 
choc refuses 0 and not ( p4 after shiZ.choc refuses 0 ), but shilschoc $I! traces(p4). 
Test generation 
Now that we have defined some implementation relations the next step is to develop test generation al- 
gorithms. We will give here an algorithm for the derivation of sound test cases for conf (Definition 4.7) 
[ 48,491. Test derivation for the relation conf has been studied a lot, especially in the context of protocol testing 
[4,1(&l 1,13,19,23,33,42,54]. Testing scenarios for other relations can, for example, be found in [ 1 ] (bisimu- 
lation equivalence), [ 18,35 ] (probabilistic testing), [ 201 (testing equivalence), [ 241 (testing preorder), [ 471 
(trace and failure equivalence using techniques from Finite State Machine testing [ 15]>, [ 25,261 (comparison 
of several testing scenarios), [ 321 (failure trace preorder), [45] (refusal testing), and [ 531 (queue preorder). 
A sound test generation algorithm for conf is an algorithm that takes a specification s E Lcirs( L), and 
returns a test suite gen,,r(s) C Ll&(L), such that (Definitions 3.2 and 3.4) : 
i conf s implies Vt E gen&s) , Va E L* : 
t I/ i after D deadlocks implies Y( t after (+ ) = pass (4.1) 
The following nondeterministic, recursive algorithm from [49] satisfies (4.1). The nondeterminism in the 
algorithm is a result of the freedom to choose any set of actions, A C init( s) in Algorithm 1, having the given 
properties. Each possible choice for this set will result in another test case, but all test cases generated in this 
way are guaran!ieed to be sound (Theorem 4.11). Moreover, the test suite that consists of all test cases that 
can be generated in this way, is exhaustive, and thus complete, although not very efficient. For complete proofs 
and optimizaticms with respect to efficiency we refer to [49]. Analogous algorithms, following more or less 
the same ideas, can be found in [ IO,1 1,19,54]. 
Algorithm 1. Let s E LcIS(L), then a test case t for s is 
t := T. { LZ ; t, j a E A ) 
where, with C,Y := {init j s=% s’), the set A C in&(s) and the verdict v(t) shall satisfy 
VC E C, : A flC # 0 and v(t) =fail 
or 0 EC, and A=init(s) and v(t) =pass 
or A =0 and v(t) =pass 
and t, is a tesi case for C { i ; s’ ( s & s’ }, which is obtained by recursively applying the algorithm. 
Theorem 4.11. Any test case obtainedfrom a spec#ication s with Algorithm 1 is sound with respect to conf, 
and the set of al! possible test cases which can be obtained using Algorithm I, is exhaustive (and thus complete). 
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Proof (Sketch). From the contraposition of the property in Proposition 4.8 it follows that i must be tested for 
all combinations of u and A such that not ( s after u refuses A ), i.e., s after u can always continue with at 
least one action of A. These are exactly the sets A in Algorithm 1 satisfying VC E C, : A f? C # 0. To test 
such sets for all (T E truces(s) the algorithm does it for the trace E, and then repeats it recursively for all traces 
a E init( s). 
Example 4.12. We will derive some test cases from p3 in Fig. 1. In the first step determine C,, := (init(p3)) = 
{ {shil}}, so we can choose A := 0 and v(t) = pass, or A := {shil} and v(t) = fail. Since the first choice does not 
lead to a very useful test case, we continue with the latter: we get the test case X{a; t, 1 a E {shil}} = shil; tshi/. 
To obtain tshil repeat the algorithm for & := i; (liq; stop Cl i; choc; stop) 0 i; choc; stop. This gives 
CPS := {init ) p; & p’} = { {Ziq, choc}, {choc}}, so possibilities for A are A = {choc}, A = {liq, choc} 
both with v( tshil) = fail, or A = 8 with V( tshil) = pass. 
With A = {choc} we have to repeat the algorithm for ~30” := i;stop. This gives A := 8 and v(t) = pass. 
Combining all steps we obtain test case t2 of Fig. 2. With A = {liq, choc} test case t3 is obtained, and with 
A = 0 we get t4. 
Algorithm 1 allows to construct arbitrarily long, but finite test cases: the nondeterminism in choosing any set 
A c init( s) satisfying one of the three constraints in the disjunction, makes that at any depth of the recursion 
in the algorithm the test case can be made longer by choosing the first or the second alternative, or the test case 
can be terminated by having the third alternative (A = 0 implies that t := X{a; tn ] a E A} = X0 = stop). To 
avoid infinite recursion the third alternative must be chosen some time, This means that the algorithm generates 
only finite test cases, thus complying with Definition 3.1. However, the algorithm may generate infinitely many 
test cases, e.g., in the case of a specification with infinite behaviour. Consider, for example, the specification 
s := a; s, then the test suite of all possible test cases (without their verdicts) generated by Algorithm 1 is 
{stop, a; stop, a; a; stop, a; a; a; stop, a; a; a; a; stop, . . .}, i.e., a test suite with infinitely many test cases, but 
each of them with finite (but arbitrarily long) behaviour. The principle to describe, or test, a system with 
infinite behaviour as a (possibly infinite) set of finite approximations is referred to as the approximation 
induction principle [ 161. 
For a practical test campaign a selection from the complete, infinite test suite should be made. This is referred 
to as test selection or test-suite size reduction [ 3 11. It is easy to see that any such a selection will always 
result in a sound test suite (Definition 3.4), i.e., a test suite that only detects errors (according to conf), but 
not necessarily all errors. The importance of the second part of Theorem 4.11 is in the fact that for all possible 
errors there is a possible test case, i.e., there are no errors that are principally undetectable with test suites 
generated with Algorithm 1. 
5. Input-output transition systems 
The implementation relations Lte and conf are defined (Definitions 4.3 and 4.7) based on symmetric 
interaction between an implementation and its environment: all actions are treated the same way, and the 
synchronous communication operator I( is commutative and fully symmetric in its operands. An interaction can 
occur if both the implementation and its environment are able to perform that interaction. If they both offer 
more than one interaction then it is assumed that by some mysterious negotiation mechanism they will agree 
on a common interaction. There is no notion of input or output, nor of initiative or direction. All actions are 
treated in the same way for all communicating systems. 
Many real implementations, however, communicate in a different manner. They do make a distinction between 
inputs and outputs, and one can clearly distinguish whether the initiative for a particular interaction is with 
the implementation or with its environment. There is a direction in the flow of information from the initiating 
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bUti” 5 k”, bUti, 
Fig. 3. Input-output transition systems, 
communicating process to the other. The initiating process determines which interaction will take place, and the 
other one can just take it or leave it. Even if the other one decides not to accept the interaction, this is usually 
implemented by first accepting it, and then initiating a new interaction in the opposite direction explicitly 
signaling the non-acceptance. One could say that the mysterious negotiation mechanism is made explicit by 
exchanging tw,o messages: one to propose an interaction and a next one to inform the initiating process about 
the (non-) acceptance of the proposed interaction. 
We will now consider a class of (models of) implementations for which the set of actions can be partitioned 
into output actions, for which the initiative to perform them is with the implementation, and input actions, for 
which the initiative is with the environment. If an input action is initiated by the environment, the implementation 
is always prepared to participate in such an interaction: all inputs of an implementation are always enabled; they 
can never be refused. Naturally an input action of the implementation can only interact with an output of the 
environment, and vice versa. Although the initiative for any interaction is in exactly one of the communicating 
processes, the communication is still synchronous: if an interaction occurs it occurs at exactly the same time 
in both processes. The communication, however, is not symmetric: the communicating processes have different 
roles in an interaction. 
Definition 5.1. An input-output transifion system p is a labelled transition system in which the set of actions 
L is partitioned into input actions Lt and output actions Lu (Lf U Lu = L, LI fl LU = Q)), and for which all 
input actions are always enabled in any state: 
\Jp’ E der( p) , Vu E LI : p’ & 
The class of input-output transition systems with input actions in L, and output actions in LU is denoted by 
ZCTS(L,, L,) c C7S(L, u LrJ). 
Example 5.2. Fig. 3 gives some input-output transition systems with L, = {butin} and L” = {ZiqO,,, choc,,,}. 
In q1 we can push the button, which is an input for the candy machine, and then the machine outputs liquor&. 
After the button has been pushed once, and also after having obtained liquorice, any more pushing of the button 
does not make anything happen: the machine makes a self-loop. In the sequel we use the convention that a 
self-loop of a state that is not explicitly labelled, is labelled with all inputs that cannot occur in that state (and 
also not via T-transitions, cf. Definition 5.1). 
Machine q2 d’zscribes a candy machine that will output either liquorice or chocolate after the button has been 
pushed. 
When studying input-output transition systems the notational convention will be that a, 6, c . , . denote input 
actions, and z,y,x,. . . denote output actions. Since input-output transition systems are labelled transition sys- 
tems all definitions for labelled transition systems apply. In particular, the synchronous parallel communication 
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can be expressed by 11 (Definition 2.4)) but now care should be taken that the outputs of one process interact 
with the inputs of the other. 
6. Implementation relations for input-output transition systems 
When we assume that implementations can be modelled by input-output transition systems in 
zo7S( L,, Lu), then the next step for a testing theory is the study of implementation relations for such 
systems. Since specifications are not necessarily written in a style having the property that input actions cannot 
be refused, we still allow specifications to be labelled transition systems: we consider implementation relations 
imp C ZOIS( L,, Lu) x CIS( LI U Lu). 
The implementation relations 5 fe and conf were defined by relating the observations, made of the imple- 
mentation by a symmetrically interacting observer u E C’TS( L) , to the observations made of the specification 
(Definitions 4.3 and 4.7). Now that we consider implementations that communicate via inputs and outputs, it 
seems natural to restrict their observing environments in the same, complementary way: u E ZO7S( L”, L,). 
In a real observer inputs and outputs can be distinguished, of which input actions can never be refused, and 
communication takes place along the lines explained in Section 5: the input actions of the observer synchronize 
with the output actions of the implementation, and vice versa. 
Analogous to the definition of testing preorder ste on L7S(L) the input-output testing relation liot is 
defined between an implementation i E ZOlS( LI, Lu) and a specification s E 137S( L, U L”) by requiring 
that any possible observation made of i by any “output-input” transition system is a possible observation of s 
by the same observer (cf. Definition 4.3). 
Note that s can be any transition system, not necessarily an input-output transition system. This transition 
system is best interpreted as a not-completely specified input-output transition system, i.e., a transition system 
where a distinction is made between inputs and outputs, but where some inputs are not specified in some 
states. Since, technically speaking, the only distinction between inputs and outputs occurs in the transition 
systems themselves, and not in their communication or observations (The definitions of obs, obs’, 11, and 
. after . deadlocks are exactly the same as for the symmetric case), there is no problem in using an “output- 
input” observer u to observe such a not-completely specified input-output transition system. Below we will 
elaborate on this possibility to have s E CIS. 
Definition 6.1. Let L be partitioned into LI and Lu, and let i E ZOIS( L,, L”), s E ,!ZcirS( L, U Lu), then 
i Sot S =def Vu E ZUTS( Lu, L,) : obs( u, i) C obs( u, s) and obs’( u, i) C obs’( u, s) 
The restriction to systems in which inputs and outputs can be distinguished, and in which inputs can never be 
refused, appears to simplify the corresponding intensional characterization of <iot (cf. Proposition 4.5) : instead 
of sets of pairs consisting of a trace and a set of actions (failure pairs), it suffices to look at two sets of traces: 
the normal traces traces(p) (Definition 2.3), and the output-suspension traces &traces(p). 
Proposition 6.2. Let &traces(p) =def {a E L’ 1 p after CT refuses L” } be the set of output-suspension 
traces of p, then 
i &t s i f f  traces(i) G traces(s) and &truces(i) 2 &truces(s) 
The notion of output suspension is analogous to the null-output that is sometimes used in Finite State 
Machine-based testing [ 151 to model the situation where an input does not produce any output. The null-output 
is then considered as a valid output, and it is an element of the output actions. In our approach the set Lu does 
not contain such a null-output; it only contains explicitly observable actions, and the absence of any outputs 
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after a certain trace is indicated by an output suspension trace. Below we will consider how output suspension 
can be considered as a special output action in our model. 
The charackrization of the input-output testing relation in Proposition 6.2 suggests to transform a labelled 
transition system into another one representing exactly these two sets of traces, so that the relation can be 
characterized by trace preorder srr (Definition 4.1) on the results of this transformation. Such a transformation 
on a labelled transition system p can be defined, and the result is called the &truce automato~z AP. To obtain AP 
a special transition is attached to each state where output suspension is possible. Then the resulting transition 
system is determinized (cf. the determinization of automata [ 281). The special transition indicating output 
suspension has label 6, and goes to a state stop, from where no other transitions can be made. The label 6 
indicates the absence of output actions in a state, i.e., it makes the absence of output actions to an explicit 
observable action. It follows that, if p E CIS( L), then A,, E 137S(L U {S}), 
Definition 6.3. Let L be partitioned into LI and L U, and let p = (S, LI U LLI, T, SO) E L’TS( L, U Lu) be a 
labelled transitl:on system, then the &truce automaton of p, A,,, is the labelled transition system (36, La, T,, qO) E 
LTS( L/ U LU U {a}), where 
’ ss =def P(S) U {stop}9 with stop a distinguished state not occurring in S or P(S) ; 
’ Ls =d<f b u Lu u {a}, with S a distinguished label not occurring in L, U Lu; 
l Ts =&f { q A q’ / a E L, u LU, q, q’ E &5, q’ = {S’ E s ( 3s E q : S &’ 3’) # 8 } 
u{qhtop /3sEq,VxELv: s&} 
Example 6.4. Fig. 4 gives the a-trace automata for 41, q2, and q3 of Fig. 3. For A4? the states, consisting of 
sets of states of q3, have been added. Note that the nondeterminism of q3 has been removed, and that state 
(~1, ~2) has a &transition, since there is a state in (~1, sz}, i.c. ~2, that can refuse all outputs. 
From the &trace automaton of p the traces and the output-suspension traces of p are easily obtained, as is 
stated in Propo.sitions 6.5( 1) and 6.5(2): the traces of A,, that contain no 6 are exactly the traces of p, and 
the traces of A,, that terminate with a &action point to an output-suspension trace. Moreover, A,, has the nice 
property that it is always deterministic (Definition 2.3), so that the transition relations 4 and & coincide, 
and each trace ~7 always goes to a unique state, denoted by AP aftercr. A state A,, after (+ can always perform 
either an output transition with n E Lu, or it can perform a a-transition. Considering the special action 8 as an 
output action of the S-trace automaton, i.e., making the absence of any output action into a special, observable 
output action of’ the S-trace automaton (cf. the null-output of an FSM, see above), we can say that any state 
of a S-trace automaton (except stop) can always do at least one output transition (Proposition 6.5(4) ) . 
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Fig. 5. Two specifications and their S-trace automata. 
Proposition 6.5. 
(1) truces(p) = traces(A,) tl L* 
(2) S-truces(p) = { ~7 E L* 1 u.6 E truces(A,>) } 
(3) A,, is deterministic. 
(4) Qa E truces(A,) n L*, 3x E LU U (6) : ( Ap aftera) 5 
An immediate corollary of Propositions 6.2 and 6.5 is that the input-output testing relation is completely 
characterized by trace preorder In on the corresponding S-trace automata. The S-trace automaton of a speci- 
fication is sufficient and necessary to define the class of &-conforming implementations. For our discussion 
concerning the implementation relation <ior we can now restrict to studying Str on S-trace automata. 
Theorem 6.6. Let i E ZOlS( L,, Lu), s E CIS( L, U Lu), then 
Example 6.7. From A,,, Ay2, and A,, (Figs. 3 and 4), using Theorem 6.6, it follows that 41 <iot q2: an 
implementation capable of only producing liquorice conforms to a specification that prescribes to produce 
either liquorice or chocolate. Although q2 looks deterministic, it in fact specifies that after burron there is a 
nondeterministic choice between supplying liquorice or chocolate. It also implies that for this kind of testing q2 
is equivalent to buti,,; Ziq,,,,; stop 0 butin; chocout; stop (plus the input self-loops), an equivalence which does not 
hold for the symmetric case. If we want to specify a machine that produces both liquorice and chocolate, then 
two buttons are needed to select for the respective candies: liq-button; liq,,,; stop 0 choc-button; c~oc,,~; stop. 
On the other hand, q2 &of 41, q3: if the specification prescribes to produce only liquorice, then an implemen- 
tation should not have the possibility to produce chocolate: bu&, .choc OUt E truces(A.,,), while buti, .chocOUt $ 
truces(A,,), truces(Ayl). 
We have q1 <i,>t q3, but q3 fiat 41, q2, since q3 may refuse to produce anything after the button has been 
pushed once, while both q1 and q2 will always output something. Formally: buh, . 8 E truces( A,,), while 
buti,,. $ truces(A,,),truces(A,,). 
Fig. 5 presents two non-input-output transition system specifications with their S-trace automata, but none of 
91, q2, q3 correctly implements st or s2 with respect to &; the problem occurs with non-specified input traces of 
the specification: buh,+bu&, E truces( A4, ), truces(A,,) , truces( Aqj), while bur&u&, $ traces( A,y, ) , traces( A,v,). 
For the input-output testing relation it is allowed that the specification is not an input-output transition 
system. A specification may have states that can refuse input actions. The intention of such specifications often 
is that the specifyer does not care about the responses of an implementation on such non-specified inputs. If 
a candy machine is specified to deliver liquorice or chocolate after pushing a button (~2 in Fig. 5), then it is 
left open what an implementation may do after pushing the button twice: perhaps ignoring it, supplying one of 
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the candies, or responding with an error message. Many labelled transition system specifications contain such 
intended implementation freedom. 
Looking at Theorem 6.6 and Fig. 5 in Example 6.7, however, we see that such implementation freedom 
cannot be expressed by the relation <ior. Trace inclusion implies that for any state of the implementation all 
enabled actions, in particular all input actions, are also enabled in the corresponding state of the specification. 
Consequently.. all input actions must always be enabled in any state of the specification, so the specification 
must be an input-output transition system, too, otherwise no implementation can exist. Labelled transition 
system specifications that are not input-output transition systems are not implementable with respect to <it,,. 
To allow for non-input-output transition system specifications to express implementation freedom for non- 
enabled inputs, we introduce a weaker implementation relation. To define this relation, i/o-conformance ioconf, 
we first give an alternative characterization of <iot (Proposition 6.9) to see where the problem occurs, and 
how it might be solved. For this characterization the output actions out(A) of a S-trace automaton are defined, 
where S occurs as a special output action as explained above. 
Definition 6.8:. Let A be a &trace automaton, then out(A) =,+f init n ( LU U (8)) 
The set out(A) will be used in particular in expressions of the form out( Aaftera > to denote the set of outputs 
(possibly including S) of the state reached after g. If u $! truces(A), then we define out( A after CT ) =dCf 8. 
Proposition 6.9. Ai <,? As iff Va E L* : out( Ai after (T) C out( A, aftero) 
In Proposition 6.9 we see that <ior requires that the outputs of the implementation are included in the outputs 
of the specification after any trace: traces of the specification, and traces that are not in the specification. A 
weaker implementation relation is obtained if this requirement is relaxed to inclusion for those traces that are 
explicitly specified in the specification (cf. the relation between 5 fe and conf, Definitions 4.3 and 4.7, and 
Propositions 4.5 and 4.8). 
Definition 6.10. Let i E Z07S( L,, LU) , s E ,US( L, u &,I ), then 
i ioconf s =def tla E truces(A,) n L* : out( Ai after CT ) & out( A, after (T ) 
Example 6.11. Consider again Figs. 3, 4, and 5. For 41, q2, q3 we still only have q1 ioconf 42 and q1 ioconf q3 
(cf. Proposition 6.12). 
But our goal of defining ioconf is to allow for implementation freedom for unspecified behaviour as in sI 
and ~2. And indeed, we have q1 ioconf st: following ioconf, st specifies only that after one button liquorice 
must be produced; with ioconf st does not care what happens if the button is pushed twice, as was the case 
with <ior. 
On the other hand, qz ioqhf s 1, since q2 can produce more than just liquorice after the button has been 
pushed once: out( Aq2 after buti, ) = {liq, C~OC} g {Ziq} = out( As, after buti, ). 
Moreover, 41 , q2 ioconf ~2, but q3 ioqhf $1, ~2, since S E out( A’43 after buti, ), 
while S $ out( A,, after buti, ) , out( AS2 after buti” ). 
The implementation relation ioconf will be the basis for the discussion of test generation in Section 7. We 
conclude this slsction with a brief comparison of the different implementation relations. 
Relating implementation relations 
The relation between the implementation relations for the symmetric case , -fr, Itr, and conf (Section 4) < 
is expressed in Proposition 4.9(2). To relate the implementation relations for input-output transition systems, 
first a generalization of ioconf is introduced. Let F C L* be any set of traces, then 
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i ioconfF s =&f vcr E F : out( Ai after (T ) c out( As after (T ) (6.1) 
The relations <iot and ioconf are special cases of iocoufF, and different relations ioconfF, and ioconfF* al-e 
easily related if the sets Ft and F2 can be related: if .Ft G 32 then ioco&, > ioconfF*. 
One might suspect that putting the relation conf (Definition 4.7) in an input-output context would result in 
ioconf i.e., that confi, defined by 
i COnfi, S =def VuEZO7S(Lu,Lr) : ( obs(u,i) n truces(s) ) 5 obs(u,s) (6.2) 
and ( obs’(u, i) n truces(s) ) 2 obs’(u, s) 
would be equal to ioconf. This is not the case. The implication holds in only one direction: 
ioconf C COllfio (6.3) 
A counter-example for the other direction is i = x; stop and s = stop, with L, = 8 and LU = {x}. One can even 
show that co& cannot be expressed in the form of (6.1) ; there is no F (depending only on s) such that 
COtlfi" = ioconfF. 
We conclude this section with observing that on ZOIS( L,, Lu), i.e., the specification is an input-output 
transition system, too, the two relations &, and ioconf coincide. 
Proposition 6.12. On Zc??-S( L,, L”): <ior = ioconf 
7. Testing input-output transition systems 
The next point of discussion is the generation of sound test suites from labelled transition system specifications 
in order to test input-output transition system implementations with respect to the implementation relation ioconf 
(Section 6, Definition 6.10). This implies that, given a specification s, a test suite gentoeonr( s) z Cl& must 
be generated, such that for any input-output transition system i: 
i ioconf s implies i passes gUZiOCOnf( s) 
or, using Definitions 3.2 and 3.4: 
(7.1) 
i ioconf S implies Vt E gentoeonr( S) , V(T E L* : 
( t 11 i) after u deadlocks implies v ( t after (T ) = pass (7.2) 
But before we can develop such a test generation algorithm, a brief discussion on the nature of test cases is 
necessary. In Sections 5 and 6 it was stated that input-output transition systems are observed by “output-input” 
transition systems, while in Definition 3.1 test cases where defined as finite, deterministic labelled transition 
systems. The intersection of both is empty: an “output-input” transition system can never have finite behaviour 
(if L” # 0). 
Since, as explained in Section 3, maximum control of the testing process by the tester is desirable, we will 
not allow test cases with a choice between an input action and an output action (input and output with respect 
to the implementation), nor a choice between multiple input actions. Both introduce nondeterminism in the test 
run: if a test case offers multiple input actions, or a choice between input and output, then the continuation 
of the test run is unnecessarily nondeterministic, since an implementation can always accept any input. This 
implies that in any state of a test case either one particular input is offered to the implementation, or all possible 
outputs are accepted. So such a test case is not an “output-input” transition system. Moreover, we still want 
test runs to be finite. This implies that at some instant the test case will stop: no actions are offered at all 
anymore. Combining these requirements we have the following definition of a test case for testing input-output 
transition systems. 
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fail fail 
Fig. 6. An input-output test case. 
Definition 7.1. An input-output test case t is a test case (Definition 3.1), which distinguishes between 
implementation inputs in L, and implementation outputs in Lu, such that for any state t’ of the test case, either 
init( t’) = {a} for some a E L,, or init( f’) = Lu, or init( t’) = 0. 
The class of input-output test cases over L, and Lv is denoted as ZO’TS,( Lu, L,). 
Example 7.2. For q2 (Fig. 3) there are two test runs with t in Fig. 6: 
where qk and qz are the final states of q2 after the liq,,,,- and chocout -actions, respectively. Although Y ( t2) = pass, 
we have that ((2 fails t, since v( t3) = fail. 
Similarly, q1 passes t and q3 fails t. 
For the development of a test generation algorithm consider again the definition of ioconf (Definition 6.10): 
i ioconf 5 =&f VCT E truces(A,) f-l L* : out( A; after (+ ) C out( A,Y after CT ) (7.3) 
In (7.3) we see that to test for ioconf we have to check for each (7 E truces(A,) (l L* whether out( Aiaftercr ) 2 
out( As after u ). Basically, this can be done by having a test case t that executes (+: 
t 11 ia t’ Ii’ 
and then checks out( Ai after a) by having transitions to pass-states for all allowed outputs (those in 
out( A,Y after CT )), and transitions to fail-states for all erroneous outputs (those not in out( A, after IT )). 
Special care should be taken for the special output 8: 6 actually models the absence of any output, so no 
transition will be made at all if i “outputs” 6; the test run will deadlock in t’ II i’. This can be checked by having 
the verdict pass in the state t’ if 6 is allowed (8 E out( As after c )), and by having the verdict fail in t’, if 
the specification does not allow to have an output suspension at that point. All this is reflected in the following 
algorithm, which is proved to generate sound test cases with respect to ioconf (Theorem 7.3 ( I) ), and which 
has the ability to detect all possible non-conforming implementations (Theorem 7.3( 2) ) . 
Algorithm 2. Let A be the S-trace automaton of a specification, then a test case t E ZCVS,( Lv, LI ) is 
obtained by a finite number of recursive applications of one of the following three nondeterministic choices: 
1. (* terminate the test case *) 
t := stop ; 
v(t) := pass ; 
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2. (* give a next input to the implementation *) 
t := a ; t’ ; 
v(t) := pass ; 
where a E init( A) fl L,, and t’ is obtained by recursively applying the algorithm for A’, with A a A’. 
3. (* check the next output of the implementation *) 
t :=C{x; stop 1 x E Lu, x $ out(A) } 0 Z { x ; tn 1 x E L”, x E out(A) } ; 
v(t) := if S E out(A) then pass else fail ; 
where v(stop) := fail for all x in the first operand, and t, is obtained by recursively applying the 
algorithm for A’, with A -5 A’. 
Theorem 7.3. 
( 1) A test case obtained from A,y with Algorithm 2 is sound for s with respect to ioconf. 
(2) The set containing all possible test cases that can be obtained with Algorithm 2 is exhaustive. 
Proof (Sketch). (For a complete proof see Appendix A.2.) 
( I ) The proof of soundness is based on defining a sufficient condition for soundness, and then using 
induction on the structure of t: 
(a) Any test case generated according to the first choice of Algorithm 2 is always sound. 
(b) Any test case generated according to the second choice is sound, if t’ is sound for A’. 
(c) In the third choice a test case with init( t) = Lu is generated: 
l If the implementation gives an output x $ out(A,), then the test case stops, and the verdict fail is 
assigned, which is sound. 
l If the implementation gives an output x E out(A,), then soundness follows by induction from 
soundness of t, for A’. 
l If the implementation does not produce any output, i.e., 8 E Out( Ai), then the test run stops, and 
the verdict pass is assigned iff 6 E out(A,), which is sound. 
(2) For proving exhaustiveness one defines a special test case t[ A,,Uj that tests whether out( Ai after a ) C 
out( As after (T). It is shown that for each (T f traces(A,y) n L* such a test case can be generated with 
the algorithm. Such a test case consists of the trace D with transitions added at the end for each x E Lu 
exactly like in the third choice of the algorithm, and with a minimal number of transitions added in the 
other states of the test case to comply with Definition 7.1. 
Example 7.4. We generate a test case for SI from A,, (Fig. 5). 
We start with giving an input: buti,, E init(A,y,) n Ll, so t := butin; t’ and v(t) = pass. 
In the next step we generate the test case t’ from A’ = liq,,,,; S; stop, where we check the outputs: 
t’ := C {x; stop 1 x E Lu, x $! {liqO,,}} 0 X(x; t, 1 x E Lu, x E { ZiqO,,}} = choc,,t; Stop Cl liq,,& tiiqou,. 
Since 6 $ out( A’), we have v( t’) = fail. Moreover, v( stop) = fail. 
Now generating tliy,, from A” = 8; stop we again check the outputs: 
%,, := Z{x; stop 1 x E Lu, x $! (6)) Cl X(x; IX ( x E Lu, n f (6)) = chocOUt; stop Cl Ziq,& stop, 
with for both v (stop) = fail, and Y ( tliqout ) = pass. 
Combining tliq,,, and t’ into t we get the test case t of Fig. 6 as a sound test case for sl, which is consistent 
with the results that we found in Examples 6.11 and 7.2: q1 ioconf sl, q2 iocdnf SI, and q3 iocg(nf SI, and 
indeed q1 passes t, q2 fails t, and q3 fails t. 
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8. Concluding remarks 
Two algorithms for test case generation from labelled transition system specifications have been presented, 
together with the implementation relations for which they test. The first relation, conf, and the corresponding 
algorithm have been published several times in literature in slightly different variations. The method is based 
on the assumptions that an implementation can be modelled as a iabeIIed transition system, and that the 
interactions between an implementation and its environment are symmetric. An interaction can occur if both 
the implementation and the environment propose that interaction, which also means that they can both prevent 
an action from occurring. 
The second implementation relation, ioconf, together with its test generation algorithm, is new. This method 
is based on the assumption that implementations communicate asymmetrically via inputs and outputs, where 
the outputs are under complete control of the implementation, whereas the implementation does not have any 
control over the inputs. Inputs are autonomously initiated by the environment, and the implementation can never 
refuse them. !3uch implementations were modelled by input-output transition systems, a subclass of labelled 
transition systems. 
The theory of testing input-output transition systems can be applied to those domains where the impiemen- 
tations under ‘test can be assumed to have the required property, which is the case for many realistic systems, 
and where the specification is expressed in a language for which the semantics can be expressed in labelled 
transition systems, which also holds for many formalisms. A special application area is the standardized formal 
description techniques Estelle [ 291 and SDL [ 171. Estelle and SDL systems communicate with their environ- 
ment via unbounded queues, which can never refuse their inputs, so any Estelle or SDL system can be modellcd 
as an input-output transition system. 
Symmetric testing versus testing with inputs and outputs 
When comparing the testing theory for conf with that for ioconf, it can be noted that the additional 
assumption of always enabled input actions renders a testing theory which is simpler in some aspects. Whereas 
implementation relations based on symmetric interactions are characterized by a set of sets of actions for each 
trace (Proposi,tions 4.5 and 4.8), the corresponding relations using inputs and outputs are characterized by just 
a set of actions for each trace (Proposition 6.9 and Definition 6.10). Moreover, using inputs and outputs each 
system is easily fully represented by a deterministic transition system: the &trace automaton (Definition 6.3 
and Theorem 6.6). 
The difference in simplicity between the respective test generation algorithms is also evident. For the sym- 
metric case (Algorithm 1) the number of different possible sets A 5 init( s) that have to be considered, 
is exponential in / init(s> 1, whereas for the input-output case (Algorithm 2) the number of possibilities is 
restricted by 1 (init(s> n LI) 1. 
Comparison writh other models 
Input-output state machines. The model of input-output transition systems is very much related to the model 
of input-output state machines (IOSM) [43 ] . The idea for the S-trace automaton is inspired by the way output 
suspension is treated in [43] : a trace machine is made where a a-transition is added to all states where no 
outputs are possible. However, the S-transitions of an IOSM do not go a special state stop, but make a self-loop 
to the same state. This implies that the implementation relations of [43] (RI,. . . , Rs), which are defined by 
trace inclusion on the resulting transformed machines, are different from ours: S-actions can occur everywhere 
in a trace, not just at the end (cf. Proposition 6.5). The precise relation between these implementation relations 
and ours is a topic for further study. In particular, it would be interesting to relate them to implementation 
relations on ,!YS by means of a testing scenario, in the same way as Ite and <io, are related. 
Two additional minor differences between ZOlS and IOSM can be noted. First, the sets of states and labels 
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may be countably infinite in Zc31S, where finiteness is required for IOSM. Secondly, ZDTS, by defining 
them as a restriction on labelled transition systems, allows for a more easy embedding in, and relating to the 
more general theory of labelled transition systems, whereas [43] uses two rather complex mappings to map 
IOSM to C’TS and vice versa. 
Input/output automata. Another model that is closely related to both IOSM and Zc31S, is that of Input/Output 
Automata (IOA) [ 371. An IOA is a transition system with the requirement that all inputs are directly enabled 
in all states, i.e., for all states s, for all a E LI: s A. This stricter requirement on input enabling implies that 
some systems are more difficult to describe as IOA than as Zc?‘TS. For example, a system consisting of an 
input/output automaton together with a bounded buffer with which it communicates with the environment, is 
not IOA, when the communication between the actual system and the buffer is hidden: if the buffer is full, no 
input actions are possible anymore without first performing an internal event. Such a system is ZOIS. 
The implementation relation that is usually used for IOA is fair trace preorder [ 361. This relation on IOA 
requires inclusion of so-called fair traces, which can be finite and infinite. An approximation using only finite 
traces is the quiescent trace preorder introduced in [ 521 and elaborated in [ 461. This relation is characterized 
by inclusion of traces and quiescent traces, a quiescent trace being almost equal to an output-suspension trace: 
it is a trace to a state where only inputs are possible, i.e., no outputs and no internal transitions. Hence 
quiescent trace preorder is almost equal to <ior (Proposition 6.2). Our conjecture is that it is equal for strongly- 
converging processes, but for diverging processes quiescent trace preorder has some counter-intuitive properties. 
For example, let d be a divergent loop, d := r; d, then i := a; d is in quiescent trace preorder with s := a; x; stop 
[ 461, This looks counter-intuitive, and it does not hold for <iot if we apply Proposition 6.2 to diverging systems. 
An effect analogous to that of ioconf, i.e., leaving implementation freedom for non-specified inputs, is 
obtained for IOA by having a so-called demonic semantics for process expressions. In this semantics a transition 
to a demonic process n is added for each non-specified input in the specification. From fi any behaviour is 
possible. Thus, after such an input also any behaviour is allowed in the implementation [ 221. 
Queue contexts. A special case of input-output transition systems are the queue systems of [ 5 1,531. These 
queue systems are labelled transition systems in a queue context, i.e., to which two unbounded queues are 
attached to model asynchronous communication, one queue for input actions, and one for output actions. 
Communication between two processes is modelled by putting actions in the respective queues. An unbounded 
queue clearly has the property that input can never be refused, while the output queue makes that from the 
system’s point of view output actions can never be refused by the environment. 
Some of the results obtained for queue systems are indeed special cases of the results obtained in this paper, 
implying that only the distinction between inputs and outputs, and the permanent enabling of input actions are 
important, not the explicit form of communication by means of queues. In this way, the queue implementation 
relations of [ 51,531 are special cases of the relations <jot and ioconf3, which is seen by noting that the 
observations 0,( cr) of a queue system are equal to our Out-set (where Qs is the queue context containing s) : 
O,v(v) =Jef {x E L” j QS & } U (6 / QS after u refuses Lu } = aut( AQ, after CT) 
It follows that queue preorder 50 is exactly the same as 5, ,01 applied to queue systems, and that <,tis), asco, 
and aconf are instantiations of ioconf3 (Eq. (6.1) ) with appropriate trace sets FT. Moreover, Proposition 6.12 
corresponds to the equality of 50 and &.(Qs), which was derived for queue systems in [ 511. 
Open problems 
Apart from establishing the precise relation with the other above mentioned theories based on inputs and 
outputs, some other open issues remain. First of all, there is the relation with the well-known Finite State 
Machine-based testing theories [ 151, which originate from hardware testing. These theories also distinguish 
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between inputs and outputs, however, each transition is labelled with a pair of input and output, not with an 
input or an output. This implies that the notion of atomicity of actions differs, which makes comparison more 
difficult. 
The problem of atomicity of actions also occurs when symmetric testing is considered as an abstraction of 
input-output tIesting. For example, the action choc of pr in Fig. 1 can be seen as an abstraction of first pushing 
a chocolate button and then obtaining chocolate. In this action refinement [2] the button-part can be seen as 
input to the candy machine, and obtaining chocolate as the output. Now test generation can be accomplished 
by first deriving a test from the abstract, symmetric specification in terms of the choc action, and then refining 
this test case into inputs and outputs, or the specification can be first refined after which an input-output based 
test generation algorithm can be used. The precise relation between testing, inputs and outputs, and action 
refinement needs further investigation. 
A third open problem is the well-known test selection problem (test-suite size reduction [ 3 1 ] ) . Algorithms 1 
and 2 can generate infinitely many sound test cases, but which ones shall be really executed? Solutions can be 
sought by defining coverage measures, fault models, test hypotheses, etc. [ 3,7,14,44]. 
Another aspect is the incorporation of data in the test generation procedure. The state explosion caused by 
the data in specifications needs to be handled in a symbolic way, otherwise automation of the test generation 
algorithm will probably not be feasible. 
A more practical problem is the implementation of the observation of an output suspension. In practical 
testers timers will have to be used for this purpose, for which the time-out values need to be chosen carefully, 
in order not to observe a suspension where there is none. 
A final rem,uk concerns divergence. Divergence causes a lot of trouble and need for extra attention in the 
study of testing theories for labelled transition systems. That is why in this paper “for technical reasons” we 
assumed to deal with strongly converging systems (Section 2). However, divergence is not a problem that 
can always be neglected. As pointed out above, our conjecture is that also the relation between the IOA and 
Zc?‘TS preord’ers depends on divergence. The main question about divergence is whether fairness is assumed: 
if a system calz perform infinitely many r-transitions, while some observable action is constantly enabled, can 
we assume that this observable action will be finally executed? Different approaches to deal with divergence 
can be found in literature [ 20,34,40,12]. For the moment we leave the topic of divergence in the context of 
conformance testing for further study. 
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Appendix A. l?roofs 
A.I. Proofs of Section 6 (Implementation relations for input-output transition systems) 
Proposition 6.2. Let &traces(p) =dCf {g E L* 1 p after (+ refuses LU } be the set of output-suspension 
traces of p, then 
i <ior s if.f traces(i) C traces(s) and &traces(i) 5 S-traces(s) 
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Proof of Proposition 6.2. (only if) Let CT E traces(i), and define ufl E ZO’TS( LU, L,), such that 3u’ 
u, % u’, then 
i& and u,%u’ 
implies u, [I i 4 
implies (T E obs’( unr i) 
implies (* premiss, Definition 6.1 *) 
u E obs’( uv, s) 
implies u, 11 s A 
implies s& 
implies (T f truces{ s) 
Let u E S-traces(i), and define u, as above, with additionally init( u’) = Lu, then 
i after (T refuses La and 3u’ : u, % u’ and init( u’) = Lu 
implies (Zli’:i&i’andVxEL~:i’&) and( 3’: u,&u’and’v’uE L,:u’&) 
implies 3i’, u’ : u,)/i%u’j/i’ and ‘V’UE L: u’/)i’=& 
implies u,, 11 i after CT deadlocks 
implies CT E obs( uU, i) 
implies (* premiss, Definition 6.1 *) 
u E obs(u,, s) 
implies u,, I[ s after u deadlocks 
implies 3u’,s’: u,,~~s~u’Ijs and VCZE L: u’ils’& 
implies (* u E ZOIS(LU, L,), so u’& for all x E LU *> 
3s’:s=%s’andVxEL”:s’g 
implies s after (T refuses Lu 
implies u E &traces (8) 











u 11 i after u deadlocks 
3u’, i’ : uIIi&u’/i’andVuE L: u’)Ii’& 
(* u’ cannot refuse outputs; i’ cannot refuse inputs *) 
3u’,i’ : u & u’ and i % i’ and init( u’) = Lu and init( i’) = L, 
3u’ : u & u’ and init( u’) = LIJ and i after u refuses Lu 
3u’ : u & u’ and init( u’) = L” and u E 6-truces(i) 
(* premiss *) 
3u’ : u & u’ and init( u’) = Lu and u E S-truces(s) 
3u’ : u &. u’ and init( u’) = LU and s after u refuses LU 
3u’:u~u’andinit(u’)=L~and3s’:s~s’andVxEL~:s’~ 
3u’, s’ : u)Is&~‘((s’andVu~ L: u’lls’& 
u II s after u deadlocks 
u E obs(u, s) 
Let u E ZU’TS(LU, L,), u E obs’(u,i), then 
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implies u & and i& 
implies u& and CT E truces(i) 
implies (* premiss *) 
u & and cr E traces(s) 
implies u 5 and s& 
implies 11 \j s 4 
implies 0. E obs’(u, s) El 
Proposition 6.5. 
(1) truces(p) = traces(A,) r-7 L* 
(2) S-trucc~s(p) = { u E L* 1 u.6 E truces(A,,) } 
(3) A, is deterministic. 
(4) ‘~“a E truces(A,) II L*, 3x E &,t U (8) : ( Ap after a) 5 
Proof of Proposition 6.5. 
( 1) Without the additional &transitions (the second term of Ts in Definition 6.3), p and the trace automaton 
of p accept the same language, i.e., have the same traces in L*. This is easily proved by induction on 
the length of the traces 1281. 
(2) By adding the transitions q -% stop the set of traces of Ap is extended with exactly the traces a.S, such 
that A, 5 q, where there is s E q, such that tlx E L~J : s 4, which corresponds to SO & s & , so CT 
is an output-suspension trace. 
(3) Without the additional &transitions, the trace automaton of p is deterministic [ 281. The addition of the 
S-transitions cannot violate determinism, since S # L, U Lu, and from any state of A,, there is at most 
one S-transition. 
(4) By construction of A, (Definition 6.3) : either 3x E L” : ( A,, aftercr ) -5, or a transition ( A, aftera ) 
&stop is added. •! 
Theorem 6.6. Let i E ZOIS(LI, L,), s E C’TS(Lj U Lu), then i <i”, s iff Ai sl, A,. 
Proof of Theorem 6.6. Directly from Propositions 6.2, 6.5( I), and 6.5( 2). 0 
Proposition 6,9. A; Fir As iff V’a E L* : out( A; after cr > 2 out( A, after u) 
Proof of Proposition 6.9. (only if, Let CJ E L*, x E out( Ai after CT ) 5 Lu U {a}, then 
AiA(Aiaftera)A 
implies CT.X E traces(Ai) 
implies (:k premiss * ) 
u.x E truces( As) 
implies x E out( As after pi ) 
(if) Let CT E: truces(Ai), and distinguish between (T E L* and CT = a’.6 with (T’ E L*, then 
UE L’: 
72 J. Tretmans/Computer Networkr and ISDN Sysiems 29 (1996) 49-79 
implies (* Proposition 6.5(4) and Definition 6.8 *) 
out( Ai after u ) # 8 
implies (* premiss *) 
out( A$ after u ) f 8 
implies 3x E Lu U {S} : A,Y * ( As after u ) -5 
implies (T E truces( A,) 
I 
Ai ti 
implies 6 E out( Ai after u’ ) 
implies (* premiss *) 
S E out( As after u’ > 
implies A, 0) ( As after u’ > 3 
implies a’.6 E traces(A,) Cl 
Proposition 6.12. On ZUTS( Lr, Lu): <iot = ioconf 
Proof of Proposition 6.12. Using Theorem 6.6, Proposition 6.9, and Definition 6.10, the C-part is trivial. For 
the >-part, let (T E L* and x E out( Ai after (T ). If (7 E truces(A,) n L* also this part is trivial, so consider 
cr E L*\truces(A,) and prove by contradiction, i.e., prove: 
30- E L*\traces(A,) : out( Ai after u ) g out( As after u ) 
implies 3u E truces(A,) n L* : out( Ai after u ) g out( As after u ) 
This is done as follows: 
3u E L*, u $! traces(A,), 3x E out( Aiafteru) : x 6 out( A,afteru) 
implies (* u # truces(A,), so there is a longest prefix u] of u which is in truces(A,); 
y E Lu, since s c Z07S( L,, Lu), so input actions are always possible *) 
3~1, u2 E L”, y E LU : u = ui +y.uz and (~1 E traces(A,) and 
u1.y $! truce.s(A,) and ut*y E traces(Ai) 
implies 3ut E truces(A,) fl L*, y E Lu : y $! out( As after u, ) and y E aut( Ai after al ) 0 
A.2. Proofs of Section 7 (Testing input-output transition systems) 
Algorithm 2 and Theorem 7.3 of Section 7 are generalized for the implementation relation ioconfF (Eq. (6.1) 
in Section 6): 
i ioconf3 s =&f VU E F : out( Ai after u ) c out( A, after u ) 
so that the algorithm can also be used for other implementation relations that can be expressed as ioconf3 for 
some F, such as &, asco, aconf, . . . . Taking 3 = traces(s) Theorem 7.3 follows directly from Corollaries A.4 
and A.7. 
Definition A.l. Let F C L* and a E L, then F after a =&f {u E L* 1 a.u E F}. 
Algorithm 3. Let A be the S-trace automaton of a specification, and let 3 C L”, then a test case t E 
ZOIS,( Lu, L, ) is obtained by a finite number of recursive applications of one of the following three nonde- 
terministic choices: 
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1. (* termmate the test case *) 
t := stop ; 
v(t) := pass ; 
2. (* give a next input to the implementation *) 
t := a . t t’ ; 
v(t) := pass ; 
where a E LI, such that F after a # 0, and t’ is obtained by recursively applying the algorithm for 
F after .a and h’, with ~5 -% A’. 
3. (* check the next output of the implementation *) 
t :=X(x; stop 1 n E Lu, x $ out(A) } q I: { x ; t, 1 x E Lu, x E out(A) } ; 
v(t) := if (S E out(A) or E $ 3) then pass else fail ; 
where v(stop) := if E E 7 then fail else pass for all x in the first operand, and t, is obtained by 
recursively applying the algorithm for F after x and A’, with A -5 A’. 
Lemma A.2. Test suite T C ZOIS,( L”, L,) is sound for s E f?TS( L, U Lu) with respect to ioconf7, if 
‘dt E T, ‘d’a E traces(t) : v ( t after u ) = fail implies 
t ( 3~’ E 3, 3x E L” : IJ = v’.x atzd 
x 6 out( As after CT’ ) ) 
or ( CT E 3 and 
S $c! out( A,v after a) and 
out( As after (T ) C init( t after u ) ) 1 
Proof of Lemma A.2. By contraposition: 
T is not sound for s with respect to ioconfF 
implies (* Definition 3.4 *) 
3i E ZO’TS( L,, Lu) : i ioconfF s and i fails T 
implies (c Definition 3.2 *) 
3i E ZO’TS( L,, L”) : i ioconf3 s and 
3t E T, 3~ E L* : t 11 i after CT deadlocks and v ( t after CT ) = fail 
implies ( c Definition 4.4 *) 
3i E ZOlS( LI, Lu) : i ioconf3 s and 
3t E T,3cr E L*,X,i’: tI/i&t’IIi’and ‘daE L: t’I/i’& and 
v( taftera) =fail 
implies (:c II in Definition 2.4, Definitions 5.1 and 7.1 *) 
3 E 207S( LI , LU ) : i ioconf3 s and 
3 E r 3u E L*, 3t’, i’ : t&-t’ and i&i’ and 
( init( t’) = 8 or ( init( t’) = Lu and init = LI ) ) and 
v ( t after (+ ) = fail 
implies ( :I: rewrite and reorder *) 
31’ E Zc37S( LI, L”) : i ioconf3 s and 
3 E T 3ff E truces(t) : Y( t after (+ ) = fail and 
( ( 3’ : iai’ and init( tafterr) =8) or ( 3i’:isi’ and init =L, ) ) anrj 
(Vu’E3,VxELu: u=u’.x implies i% ) 
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implies (* definition iocone (6.1), Propositions 6.5( 1), 6.5( 2), and 6.5(4) *) 
ZliEZCUS(LI,Lv): Vu~F:oout(A~afteru) cout(A,vafteru) and 
3 E T, 3a E traces(t) : v ( t after u ) = fail and 
( ( out( hi after a) f 0 and init( t after a) = 0 ) or 6 E out( Ai after a) ) and 
( Vu’ E 3,Vx E Lu : (T = u’.x implies x E out( hi after u’ ) ) 
implies ( * rewrite using the first line *) 
3 E T, 3u E traces(t) : v ( t after u ) = fail and 
( u E F implies 
( ( out( AS after u ) # 0 and init( t after a) = 8 ) or 6 E out( A, after u ) ) ) and 
( Vu’ E F,V’x E LU : u.=u’.x implies x E out( A,afteru’) ) 
implies (* reorder *> 
3t E T, 3u E traces(t) : v( t after u ) = fail and 
( ( Vu’EF, VxE L”: u=u’.x implies 
x E out( AS after u’ > ) 
and (u $8 F or 
6 E out( AS after u) or 
out( A, after u ) e init( r after u ) ) ) 0 
Lemma A.3. Let A be a &race automaton, F C L’, and let t be a test case generated with Algorithm 3, 
then 
Vu E traces(t) : v( t after u > = fail implies 
( (3u’~.F, 3x~L”: u=u’,xand 
x 4 or&( A after u’ ) ) 
or ( u E .F and 
6 $ out( A after a) and 
ouT( A after u ) c init( t after u ) ) 1 
Proof of Lemma A.3. By induction on the structure of t: 
l Let t = stop and y(t) = pass, then the lemma is trivially fulfilled. 
l Let t = a; t’ and v(t) = pass, with a E L,, and t’ generated from F after a and A’, A % A’, and let 
u E truce,s ( r) and v ( t after u ) = fail, then it follows that u = a. u’ (u’ E L*) , u’ E traces ( t’) , and 
I/ ( t’ after u’ ) = fail. 
According to the induction hypothesis the lemma can be assumed to hold for A’, Faftera , and t’, hence 
( ~U”E 3aftera, 3x~L~~:u’=u”.x and x$kout(A’afteru”) ) 
or ( u’ E Fafter a and 6 $! out( A’ after u’ ) and out( A’ after u’ ) & init( t’ after u’ ) ) 
If the first operand of the disjunction holds, then it follows directly from Definition A.1 that a.u” E F 
and u = a.u’ = a.8.x and x fj! oul( A after a.&’ ). 
If the second operand of the disjunction holds, then it follows directly from Definition A.1 that a.u’ E F 
and S +! out( A after a-u’ ), and moreover: 
out( A after a.(~’ ) = out( A’ after u’ ) C_ init( t’ after u’ ) = init( t after a.u’ ). 
l Lett=Z{x ; stop ) x f L”, x +! out(A) } Cl Z { x ; tx ( x E Lu, x E out(A) ) with v(t) = if 
(F E out(A) or E $! .F) then pass else fail, v(stop) = if E E F then fail else pass for all x in the first 
operand, and tx is generated from .F after x and A’, with A -fi A’. 
Let u E traces(t) and v( t after u ) = fail, then u = E or u = y .u’ (u’ E L*, y E Lu). Distinguish for 
the latter between y E out(A) and y $! out(A): 
u=~:Fromv(tafteru)=v(t)=failwehave6$out(A) andEEF,andsinceinit(t)=Luwehave 
out( A after u ) = out(A) C init( t) = init( I after u ). 
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(T = y.u’, y E out(A): According to the induction hypothesis the lemma can be assumed to hold for A’, 
3 after y , and t,, and moreover u’ E traces( t?) and v( tY after u’ ) = fail, hence 
( 3~” E Faftery , 3x E Lu : (+I = #.x and x 4 out( A’afterv”)) 
or ( CT’ E F after y and 8 $ out( A’ after CT’ ) and out( A’ after (T’ ) C init( t, after v’ ) ) 
If the first operand of the disjunction holds, then it follows directly from Definition A.1 that y. U” E 
Fandor=y.a’=y.a”.x andx$out(Aaftery.a”). 
If the second operand of the disjunction holds, then it follows directly from Definition A.1 that y.c+’ E .F 
and 6 $2 out( A after y.a’ ), and moreover: 
out( A after y-a’ ) = out( A’ after u’ ) C in&( t, after CT’ ) = init( t after y.g’ ). 
(7 = YYY’, y $ out(A): It follows that t -S stop and (+I = E, and hence from v( t, after u’ ) = v( rY) = fail 
that&E~,s~~=y.(+‘=y=&.y,andy~out(A)=out(Aafter(T’). 0 
Corollary A.4. A test case obtainedfrom A, and 3 with Algorithm 3 is soundfor s with respect to ioconfF. 
Proof of Corollary A.4. Directly from Lemmas A.2 and A.3. 0 
Definition A.!;. Let A be a S-trace automaton, and (+ E L*, then the test case t[A,rr] E ZOIS,( Lu, L,) is 
defined by 
tlA,El =dej z { x ; stop 1 x E Lu } 
where V( tlA,E]) := if 8 E out(A) then pass else fail 
and for each branch x; stop : 
v(stop) := if x E out(A) then pass else fail 
t[A.,.,l (a E LI) =dej a ; t[ A aftera ,d 
where V( t,a,,.,] ) := pass 
t[A,yrrj (y E ‘%I) =d<f c { x ; stop 1 x E LU, x + Y } 0 Y ; tl A aftery,o] 
where v( t[A,p,q] ) := pass 
and for each branch x; stop : v( stop) := pass 
Lemma A.6 
( 1 ) t[A,v] -% t[ A aftercr .c]. 
(2) h?t 3 := {a}, then t[ A,V] can be obtained with Algorithm 3. 
(3) The test case ~FA,,~~ is exhaustive for s with respect to ioconf{,,). 
(4) The test suite { t[A,y,gl 1 CT E 3 } is exhaustive for s with respect to ioconf3. 
Proof of Lemma A.6. 
(1) By induction on the length of (T: 
g = E: Trivial. 
u = u’d,a E LI: tl&&] = u ; t[ Aafteru,o’] A 
t[ Aanera,C’] d (* induction *) 
t[(Aaftero)afterd,el =t[Aafkerrr.~] 
(+ = yd, y E L”: t[A,y.,J] = I; { x ; Stop 1 x E LUvX f Y } q Y i f[Aaftery,d] L 
t( A afterY ,+] -6 (* induction *> 
f[(Aafterg)after~‘,~] =t[Aaftercr,~] 
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(2) By induction on the structure of t[ ~,a] : 
t[&]: Apply the third choice of Algorithm 3, and apply for each t, the first choice. 
t[ A&.a] : Apply the second choice of Algorithm 3, and repeat the algorithm for t[ A anera ,@, .
t[A,#,] : Apply the third choice of Algorithm 3, apply for each fX with x # y the first choice, and repeat 
the algorithm for t[ A after y ,uj. 
(3) To be proved (Definitions 3.4, 3.2, and (6.1)): i passes t[~,,~] implies i ioconf{,) S, i.e., 
vlp E L* : (t[A,& 11 i) after p deadlocks implies v( t[A& after p > = pass 
implies out( Ai after g > C out( AS after B ) 
Let x E out( Ai after CT ), and distinguish between x E LIJ and x = 8, then 
x E Lu: 
cr.* Ai- 
implies ( * Proposition 6.5 ( I ) *) 
3i’, i” : i ~ i’ ; i” 
implies ( * Lemma A.6( 1) *) 
t[A,,cr] IIi~t[Asafteru,&] IIi’ASfoPiii” 
implies (* Definition 4.4 *) 
(t[A& 11 i) after (+ . x deadlocks 
implies (* premiss *) 
v( t[As,c] after (T’x ) = pass 
implies ( * t[ A,,C] after (T’x = t[ A, &ru,E] after x = stop, 
verdict assignment for stop in Definition A.5 *> 
x E out( As after a) 
implies (* Proposition 6.5( 2) *) 
32 : i&i’ and V.xEL”:i’$ 
implies (* Lemma A.6( 1) and init(t[ 8, aftercr,Ej) = Lu *) 
a 
3i’ : t[Ld 11 ia t[ A., afteru.4 iI i’ ad vu E L : t[ A. ara ,&I II i’+ 
implies (* Definition 4.4 *) 
( t[A,,o] 11 i) after (T deadlocks 
implies (* premiss *> 
v( qA,,,] afteru) = pass 
implies (* verdict assignment for ( tlAs,nj after u) = t[ Aafterm,E] *) 
S E out( A, after c> 
(4) Immediately from Lemma A.6( 3). 0 
Corollary A.7. The set containing all possible test cases that can be obtained with Algorithm 3 is exhaustive 
for s with respect to ioconfF. 
Proof of Corollary A.7. Immediately from Lemma A.6(4), together with Lemma A.6( 2)) and the fact that 
for two test suites Tl and T2, if T, G T2 and Tj is exhaustive, then T2 is exhaustive, which follows directly from 
Definitions 3.4 and 3.2. [I3 
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